

Elizabeth S. Anderson (University of Michigan): “The Epistemology of Democracy”

Natural phenomena and social policies have asymmetrical impacts on the members of societies marked by social stratification and geographic diversity. Because individuals' direct knowledge tends to be limited to themselves and their limited social circle, information about these impacts is similarly asymmetrically distributed. Democracy can be viewed as an institution for pooling widely distributed information about these phenomena by engaging the participation in public discussions of diverse knowers. Democratic norms of free discourse, feedback, and accountability can be understood as functioning to ensure collective, experimentally-based learning from the diverse experiences of different knowers. Building on John Dewey's democratic theory, I propose such an epistemic theory of democracy as a ground for understanding democratic models of epistemology.

John Beatty (University of British Columbia): “Group Deliberation”

In this paper I will consider the inner workings of a group of scientists charged with deciding not only a technically difficult, but also a socially and politically important issue, namely the long-term genetic effects of radiation. The group's deliberations took place during the height of the cold war. I will focus on the competing virtues—as articulated by members of the group—of reaching consensus vs. reporting accurately the nature and degree of disagreement among them. Central issues also include: How, in real-world situations is the degree of consensus of a group of scientists determined and achieved? How is disagreement agreed upon? How are the epistemic outcomes (or reported outcomes) of a group's deliberations weighed and negotiated in connection with the credibility, authority and expertise of the group?

Sue Campbell (Dalhousie University): “Performing Counter-memory”

In examining the relevance of diversity to issues of epistemic dissent, we must take into account: 1) that epistemic dissent is often at the same time political dissent; 2) that dissent can be expressed through diverse epistemic vehicles. Counter-memory, for example, is often expressed through political performance and protest. Using Diana Taylor's work on political memory performance, this paper examines some of the ways in which we must rethink the norms that govern good remembering in order to acknowledge and assess diverse expressions of memory, including those which are not truth-apt. I develop a notion of “faithful” memory as a complex epistemological/ethical achievement involving dimensions of accuracy, integrity, and responsibility.

David Coady (University of Tasmania, Australia): "When Experts Disagree"

In "Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?" Alvin Goldman has criticised the procedure of "going by the numbers", when evaluating the opinions of experts who disagree with one another. Although Goldman is right to criticise this procedure, his argument against it involves a mistake. Understanding this mistake has significant implications, not only for the problem Goldman is addressing, but also, more broadly, for the nature of our epistemic dependence on others. I use the literature on information cascades to clarify the nature of Goldman's error, and to identify an element of truth in his account.

Lorraine Code (York University): "Advocacy, Negotiation, and the Politics of Unknowing"

Working from the conceptual framework I develop in my *Ecological Thinking* (Oxford University Press, 2006), I will argue that in countering a politics of unknowing that holds hegemonic, individualistic epistemic assumptions in place, negotiation and advocacy acquire a new salience. In orthodox theories of knowledge that are neither naturalized nor socialised, such practices claim scant recognition. A persistent belief in the power of direct, interchangeable observation and disinterested, disengaged justificatory procedures generates suspicion of such processes, that often are discredited as deriving out of vested interest rather than objective quests for truth. I will propose, however, that without advocacy and the negotiations it commonly enlists, knowledge is not possible, in a strong sense, across diverse communities and social-ecological situations.

Nancy Daukas (Guilford College): "Epistemic Trust and Social Location"

An ideal epistemic community is socially diverse, and strives for 'strong objectivity' by extending epistemic 'uptake' to all. In real communities, community-sanctioned epistemic uptake is often granted or withheld on the basis of social location. Because of the interplay of epistemic character, second-order epistemic attitudes, first-order beliefs, and social environment, this epistemic exclusion on the basis of social location degrades the epistemic virtue of those who exclude and those excluded, thereby degrading the epistemic potential of the community as a whole. Hence epistemically exclusive communities are self-perpetuating and epistemically self-defeating. The main question that arises is: how can this process be reversed? One part of the answer is: through integrating (the appropriate sort of) epistemology into the curriculum of secondary education.

Miranda Fricker (Birkbeck College, University of London): "Epistemic Injustice in Social Knowledge"

First I explore the idea that there is a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice - 'hermeneutical injustice' - which occurs when someone's social experience is rendered unintelligible owing to a certain unevenness in the collective social-interpretive repertoire. Such unevenness is a matter of shared forms of understanding being structurally 'prejudiced' in the sense that power inequalities have rendered them unevenly informed by the experience of different social groups. Second I characterize a corrective virtue on the part of hearers - the virtue of hermeneutical justice.

Rebecca Kukla (Carleton University): "Objectivity and Contingency in Empirical Knowledge"

One traditional hallmark of the propriety of an epistemic practice is that it provides an aperspectival warrant. That is to say, epistemologists generally think that genuine warrant that is available to anyone must be available to everyone who is exposed to the relevant causal inputs and is able and willing to properly exercise her rationality. The motivating idea behind this requirement is roughly that an objective view is one that is not bound to a particular perspective or distorted by the intervening presence of the inquirer herself. Against this picture, from feminist and Marxist quarters among others, there have emerged various 'standpoint theories', according to which some inquirers may have contingent properties and perspectives that give them access to forms of rational warrant and objective knowledge that are not available to other inquirers inhabiting different standpoints. In this paper I ask whether the aperspectivity of our warrants is a precondition for securing the objectivity of our claims. I argue that rather than simply scrapping the aperspectivity requirement, we should transform its logical place in our understanding of objective knowledge and epistemic warrant. Universal accessibility, on my account, is not a precondition for the legitimacy of any actual warrant, but rather a regulative ideal that necessarily governs inquiry and communication.

Kristina Rolin (Academy of Finland Research, Helsinki School of Economics): "The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology"

Sandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology is perhaps the most ambitious and controversial attempt to argue that diversity among knowers is an epistemic advantage to a community of knowers. Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology gives rise to a philosophical problem which Louise Antony has called the bias paradox. In emphasizing that all knowledge is partial, feminist standpoint epistemology challenges the very notion of impartiality. But by undermining the

notion of impartiality, feminist standpoint epistemology is in danger of losing its critical edge. In my paper I propose a solution to the bias paradox as it concerns feminist standpoint epistemology. I will argue that a solution to the bias paradox requires that we revise feminist standpoint epistemology in two ways. First, we have to be more specific about what socially grounded perspectives mean in scientific inquiry. By this I mean that one should be able to put one's finger on the particular assumption or assumptions in an inquiry that manifest an inquirer's perspective on social reality. Being able to identify a particular assumption or a set of assumptions is important because it enables one to weigh the strengths and the weaknesses of these assumptions, and thereby assess the relative merits of different perspectives. Second, I will argue that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification gives us a framework for comparing different perspectives (which, I argue, need to be articulated in the form of assumptions) without evoking the troubling image of "the view from nowhere" rejected by feminist standpoint epistemology. I suggest that "the view from nowhere" is motivated by foundationalist theories of epistemic justification. I will follow Michael Williams who argues that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification is a viable alternative to foundationalism.

Miriam Solomon (Temple University): "Epistemic Diversity or Epistemic Randomness? (Or, More on the Invisible Hand of Reason)"

Knowledge is always situated, whether by environment, social location, political location, historical context, goals or individual embodiments. Situatedness makes knowledge possible, but it also makes knowledge partial. Epistemic diversity counters this partiality. In this paper I ask whether it is important for science policy to encourage particular types of diversity or whether, on the other hand, a laissez faire attitude towards already existing kinds of cognitive diversity is good enough.

Deborah Perron Tollefsen (University of Memphis): "Scientific Teamwork: Is There Room for Dissent?"

I argue in this paper that scientific teamwork as a form of joint action necessarily involves social cohesion. Without such cohesion there is no unity of agency and such unity is required for sustaining joint action. This puts us in a rather difficult position. Collaboration has been viewed as a valuable tool for producing empirical success. Indeed, in many sciences collaboration or teamwork is not an option; it is a requirement. But team research necessarily requires a high level of social cohesion and thus there is the very real possibility of groupthink and the suppression of dissent. For the past three decades philosophers of science, in particular feminist philosophers of science, have challenged the individualism present in much of 20th century theorizing about science and scientific methodology. Science is done not by individuals but by teams, groups, and communities (Nelson 1990, Longino 1990,

Solomon 2003). But in acknowledging this we must also acknowledge that the space for dissent has been diminished.

Daniel Marc Weinstock (Université de Montréal): "What is Public Reason?"

An influential current of thought in contemporary democratic theory holds that the achievement of consensus on collective binding norms enforced by the state's monopoly on legitimate force requires that citizens deliberate in abstraction of their diverse "comprehensive conceptions of the good (CCGs)". I contest this on grounds both pragmatic and principled. First, the argument rests on an unargued and unjustified privileging of consensus over compromise. Second, it falsely assumes that CCGs are not sources of moral knowledge potentially relevant to the elaboration of robust compromises. And third, it fails to account for what I take one of the principle grounds for the robustness of compromises to be, namely that citizens be able to identify with the process through which compromise is reached.